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Abstract One objection to enhancement technologies
is that they might lead us to live inauthentic lives.
Memory modification technologies (MMTs) raise this
worry in a particularly acute manner. In this paper I
describe four scenarios where the use of MMTs might
be said to lead to an inauthentic life. I then undertake
to justify that judgment. I review the main existing
accounts of authenticity, and present my own version
of what I call a “true self” account (intended as a
complement, rather than a substitute, to existing
accounts). I briefly describe current and prospective
MMTs, distinguishing between memory enhancement
and memory editing. Moving then to an assessment of
the initial scenarios in the light of the accounts
previously described, I argue that memory enhance-
ment does not, by its very nature, raise serious
concerns about authenticity. The main threat to
authenticity posed by MMTs comes, I suggest, from
memory editing. Rejecting as inadequate the worries
about identity raised by the President’s Council on
Bioethics in Beyond Therapy, I argue instead that
memory editing can cause us to live an inauthentic life
in two main ways: first, by threatening its truthfulness,
and secondly, by interfering with our disposition to
respond in certain ways to some past events, when we
have reasons to respond in such ways. This consider-
ation allows us to justify the charge of inauthenticity in
cases where existing accounts fail. It also gives us a
significant moral reason not to use MMTs in ways that





One objection to the use of human enhancement
technologies is that it might threaten our authenticity.
1
Memory modification technologies (MMTs for short)
raise this worry in a particularly acute manner. In their
much discussed report Beyond Therapy, the members
of the President’s Council on Bioethics thus write that
[a]mong the larger falsehoods to which such
practices [as memory modification] could lead
us, few are more problematic than the extreme
beliefs regarding the possibility—and impossibil-
ity—of human control. Erring on the one side, we
might come to imagine ourselves as having more
control over our memories and identities than we
really do, believing that we can be authors and
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1 See e.g. Elliott [11]; The President’s Council on Bioethics,
[35], chap.5; Parens [27], pp.39–40.
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e-mail: alexandre.erler@philosophy.ox.ac.ukeditors of our memories while still remaining truly
—and true to—ourselves [35,p .2 3 0 ] .
The authors are concerned that MMTs might
induce in us a mistaken belief about the degree of
control we have over our identities, i.e. the belief that
we can take control of our memories while still
preserving our identity. Let me note the particular way
they phrase their concern: the suggestion is that
“being the authors and editors of our memories” is
incompatible with remaining true to ourselves. Given
that authenticity is often identified with the idea of
being “true to oneself”, the concern in this passage
seems to be that controlling our memories thanks to
MMTs will make us inauthentic.
What sort of cases might give rise to such a
concern? Consider the following four scenarios:
1. The Lady Macbeth case. It is presented by the
authors of Beyond Therapy themselves, in another
passage where they suggest that MMTs might
pose a threat to our “identity”:
But if enfeebled memory can cripple identity,
selectively altered memory can distort it. Changing
the content of our memories or altering their
emotional tonalities, however desirable to alleviate
guilty or painful consciousness, could subtly
reshape who we are, at least to ourselves. With
altered memories we might feel better about
ourselves, but it is not clear that the better-feeling
“we” remains the same as before. Lady Macbeth,
cured of her guilty torment, would remain the
murderess she was, but not the conscience-stricken
being even she could not help but be [35,p .2 1 2 ] .
In this scenario, Lady Macbeth uses MMTs to escape
the feelings of guilt she experiences after having
spurred her husband to murder king Duncan. As the
passage suggests, this could take two forms: she could
remove the memory completely, or attenuate its
emotional impact. Call the first alternative the
amnesiac, and the latter the carefree Lady Macbeth.
I shall consider both variants in a subsequent section.
2. Elisabeth’s case. During her high school years,
Elisabeth was the black sheep of her class: the
other girls did not want her in their clique. Until
she moved to university her everyday experience
was mostly one of social exclusion and even
bullying. Fortunately, Liz’s life has taken a much
better turn since then: she now has a successful
career, a wonderful family of her own, and is
generally quite a happy person. Yet she resents
the way her classmates have treated her (even
though these feelings are not obsessive and do not
impair her functioning), and does not wish to
have anything to do with them in the absence of
an apology on their part. Since none of them has
ever volunteered such an apology, even when she
hinted at the topic in her (negative) reply to their
invitation at a class reunion, Liz now keeps her
distance—for example, she never attends such
reunions. A friend of Liz, Sonya, has endured
similar mistreatments during high school. Yet
thanks to her different native temperament, bad
things tend to just “roll off her back”, and she
bears no grudge to those who mistreated her. She
goes to most class reunions, and is now on good
terms with her former classmates, as if nothing
bad had ever happened to her. On hearing Sonya
and other friends speak of their high school years
in much more positive terms than she can herself,
Liz feels envious. She wishes she did not feel so
strongly about these past offences. When she
learns about the existence of MMTs, Liz decides
to blunt the emotional impact of her memories of
rejection and bullying. As a result, her past
misfortunes no longer seem to her so bad as to
warrant resentment towards her former class-
mates, and she finds herself willing to forgive
them without expecting an apology anymore. She
gets in touch with some of them on a social
networking site, and for the first time is able to
positively interact with them. The good moments
she had as a teenager are no longer overshadowed
by her memories of victimization, and Liz
definitely feels that her use of MMTs has allowed
her to enhance her overall well-being.
3. Carl’sc a s e . For years, Carl has been subjected to
serious physical and sexual abuse. As a result, he
has become consumed by hatred towards man-
kind and has embraced a life of crime. After
shooting a policeman during an armed robbery,
Carl is arrested and sentenced to 30 years in
prison. The psychiatrists who examine him
conclude that even though he is not, strictly
speaking, mentally ill, he would be less of a
danger to society on his release if he were given
236 A. Erlersomeformoftreatment.Psychotherapywouldbethe
traditional option, but they now have an alternative:
erasing and replacing the traumatic memories that
had fuelled his feelings of hatred, as well as the
memories of his worst crimes, which had turned him
into a hardened criminal. The doctors can expect
such amethodto producethesame results astherapy
in a quicker and less costly manner. They thus offer
Carl the option to “edit” his memories in exchange
for parole. He accepts the deal.
4. Solomon’s case. Solomon is always on the lookout
for ways of becoming more effective at his job as a
journalist. He started using memory enhancing
drugs as soon as they became available, and is very
pleased with the accuracy of his enhanced memory
capacity. Yet now he also finds that he has become
unable to forget any personal failure, no matter how
minor, that he gets to experience: the memories of
them keep coming back to his mind, each time as
vivid as before. Once a well-adjusted person with a
high self-esteem, he is now struggling with feelings
oflowself-worththatseemcompletelyalientohim.
Although he continues using the enhancers because
of the benefits he derives from them, Solomon is
very annoyed by their effect on his own self-image.
My impression is that the agents in all of these
scenarios end up living inauthentic lives after manip-
ulating their memory. Lady Macbeth, Elisabeth, and
Carl are also making inauthentic choices, even though
these choices lead to a gain in well-being.
In what follows I will undertake to justify those
verdicts. I shall begin by distinguishing three main
ways of understanding authenticity, and will offer my
own account, which relies on the idea that authenticity
consists in somehow being faithful to your true self
(anotionIwillundertaketofleshoutanddefendagainst
objections). After a brief review of existing and
prospective MMTs, where I will distinguish between
memory enhancement and memory editing, I shall
consider the respective implications of the aforesaid
accounts of authenticity for the four scenarios just
described. I shall argue that they concur in declaring
Solomon’s life inauthentic to some degree after he
starts enhancing his memory, but will add that his case
only involves contingent side effects and that memory
enhancement does not, by its very nature, seem to
warrant concerns about authenticity. The main threat to
our authenticity, I will suggest, comes from memory
editing, as illustrated by scenarios 1 to 3 above.
Rejecting as inadequate the worries about identity
raised by the President’s Council on Bioethics, I will
argue instead that memory editing can cause us to live
an inauthentic life in two main ways. First, it can
undermine the truthfulness of our lives. Secondly, even
when it does not do so, it can still mean deliberately
interfering with a disposition we possess to respond in
certain ways to some past events, when we have
reasons to respond in such ways. This consideration is
left out by rival accounts of authenticity (even though
these accounts do have sound points to make), which
are therefore unable to support the charge of inauthen-
ticity at least in the case of Liz. Yet I think it gives us a
significant moral reason not to use MMTs in ways that
w o u l dl e a dt os u c ha no u t c o m e .
What is Authenticity?
Three Different Accounts
First, we need to get clear about what we mean exactly
whenwetalkaboutauthenticityoranauthentic life.The
term “authenticity” doesn’t have one single, universally
accepted meaning, even among philosophers. Three
main ways of understanding the notion can be found in
thecontemporaryphilosophicalliterature:first,theview
of authenticity as wholeheartedness; secondly, existen-
tialist accounts of authenticity; and finally, what I shall
call “true self” accounts.
The view of authenticity as wholeheartedness is
sometimes attributed to Harry Frankfurt,
2 even though
as far I am aware he doesn’t use the term “authentic-
ity” himself (and clearly doesn’t consider its implica-
tions for the use of enhancement technologies). On
this view, authenticity consists in a second-order
identification with one’s first-order desires, an identi-
fication that is “wholehearted” in the sense that it
doesn’t involve any ambivalence at the second-order
level (Frankfurt [13]; [14] pp. 91ff). On this account,
the authentic agent is one who acts upon desires and
preferences with which she wholeheartedly identifies.
Choices and actions involving such wholehearted
2 See e.g. Litton [21], p.66; Christman [2]; Cottingham [3], p.10.




it with honesty and autonomy in the choices one makes
and the way one shapes one’sl i f es t o r y ,w i t ht a k i n gf u l l
responsibility for such choices and avoiding bad faith
(see e.g. Sartre [31], p.90; DeGrazia [7], p.112).
4 In
what follows I shall focus on DeGrazia’sa c c o u n ta s
exemplar of an existentialist view. We might note that
his conditions for authenticity are more demanding
than those set by the account of authenticity as
wholeheartedness. DeGrazia thus characterizes auton-
omous action in the following way:
A autonomously performs intentional action X iff
(1) A does X because she prefers to do X, (2) A
has this preference because she (at least disposi-
tionally) identifies with and prefers to have it, and
(3) this identification has not resulted primarily
from influences that A would, on careful reflec-
tion, consider alienating [7,p . 1 0 2 ] .
We can see here that autonomy as DeGrazia
understands it presupposes something like authentic-
ity as wholeheartedness (conditions (1) and (2)).
However, autonomy is itself a necessary, but not
sufficient condition for authenticity in DeGrazia’s
sense: honesty is required as well.
Finally, true self accounts of authenticity under-
stand it as the quality of being faithful to a “true” self
that is to some extent given to us, rather than being
solely the product of our own choices, even honest
and autonomous ones (see e.g. Taylor [34], pp. 25–
29; Elliott [12], pp. 49–52). The true self account that
I find most promising understands authenticity as a
virtue: the virtue of being faithful to one’s true self,
when doing so is intrinsically valuable. Conversely, I
understand inauthenticity as the failure to be true to
yourself when doing so would have been valuable, if
done for the right reasons.
5 On this account, someone
who, with sufficient constancy, remains true to
himself when doing so is valuable will count as living
an authentic life. By contrast, failing to do so when it
would have been valuable will lead to an inauthentic
life. Also, I will regard a person as making an authentic
choice, or as acting authentically, if her choice or action
involves staying true to herself when doing so is
intrinsically valuable and praiseworthy. If she fails to
remaintruetoherselfwhendoingsowouldhavebeenat
least prima facie praiseworthy in her specific circum-
stances (again, if done for the right reasons), I will
count her choice or action as inauthentic. It is not
necessary to accept my own version of a true self
account in all its details in order to agree with the
points I shall make later about reasons to feel and
react, and the risk that MMTs might be used in ways
that disconnect us from them. However, for the
purpose of our discussion, I believe that my account
has the advantage of being more clearly articulated
than other true self accounts, like Elliott’s, that might
lead to similar normative conclusions.
I acknowledge that the Frankfurtian and existen-
tialist accounts do capture many of our uses of the
notion of authenticity. My own account is meant to
complement rather than supplant them. Some of the
cases I have described, like that of Solomon, can be
satisfactorily explained by these rival accounts.
However, as we shall see, they have trouble explain-
ing other cases of inauthenticity, such as Elisabeth’s.
Existentialists are also wrong to dismiss the idea of a
pre-given “true self”, as I will now try to show.
The “True Self”
A number of authors have thus rejected as implausible
t h ei d e at h a tw eh a v es o m e t h i n gl i k eat r u es e l f ,t h e
features of which are at least partly independent of our
choice(seee.g.DeGrazia[7], pp. 233–34; Levy [19], p.
73). I believe that such doubts are unwarranted, and that
they usually depend on the assumption that such a self
must be construed as an individual essence. If it were
an essence, by definition it could not be changed on
pain of bringing the relevant person’s existence to an
end (and presumably bringing a new, distinct individual
into existence). But we need not take such a view of the
true self. The notion, I think, is best understood by
appeal to the idea of narrative identity. Narrative
identity is usually contrasted with numerical identity.
The former notion allows us to answer what Marya
3 Dworkin’s( [ 10], p.25) view of authenticity as harmony
between first and second-order desires is very similar to the
view of authenticity as wholeheartedness, and my remarks
about the latter will apply to the former as well.
4 I don’t mean to suggest that these two authors hold exactly
the same view of authenticity, but for the purposes of our
discussion I will deal with them together. I shall assume that the
Sartrean requirement to avoid bad faith is satisfied when
DeGrazia’s honesty condition is.
5 I am using “being true to yourself” and “being faithful to your
true self” interchangeably.
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what is the set of characteristics that makes me the
person I am, i.e. which actions, experiences, desires,
values, character traits, etc. are “truly attributable” to
me? Numerical identity, on the other hand, has to do
with what Schechtman calls the reidentification ques-
tion—what is it that makes me one and the same person
at two different points in time [32,p p .7 3 –76]? This is
the question traditional theories of personal identity are
trying to answer, whether they appeal to continuity of
immaterial substance, psychological continuity, etc.
The trueself, asI propose tounderstandit, comprises
the central features of that person’s narrative identity—
central, in that they significantly shape the form of her
life, including the way other people treat her. Such
features include her personality traits; character traits,
understood as dispositions to respond in certain ways to
certain events, and see these as providing reasons to
respond in such ways
6; personal likes and dislikes
(including for instance one’s sexual orientation, with
regard to the example that I shall use in a moment);
self-image; or moral and religious commitments.
7
Some of these features are partly independent of our
choice, yet it seems that all of those I have listed can
change through time in a particular person, without
threatening her numerical identity.
This view denies DeGrazia’s contention that the
features of the kind just mentioned will only count as
part of someone’s identity, or of her true self, if the
person identifies with them (DeGrazia [6], pp. 37–38).
Consider the following case:
1. Oscar’s case. Oscar is a 20 year-old gay man. He
is unhappy with his sexual orientation, and has
resolved to work on himself with a therapist who
agreed to help “cure” him. However, 10 years
later, after having tried various therapeutic tech-
niques, Oscar still feels exclusively attracted to
members of his own sex, and has been involved
in a series of affairs with other men, of which he
feels deeply ashamed. Fortunately for Oscar, his
therapist then offers him to participate in the trials
for a new chemical treatment destined to remove
homosexual inclinations. The treatment works,
and Oscar is delighted to have at last found a
“cure” for his “condition”.
DeGrazia’s view implies that being gay is not part of
Oscar’s true self even during the 10 years he spends
unsuccessfully fighting his inclinations (and feeling
very bad about it), since Oscar doesn’t endorse these
inclinations. But surely this is implausible. Whether or
not someone is gay has to do with whether or not the
person feels sexually attracted to members of his own
sex, not with his identifying (or not) with his sexual
preferences. And if his gayness makes a significant
difference to the person’s life, as it clearly does in the
case of Oscar until he undergoes treatment, then
arguably it is part of the person’s true self, even if he
himselfdeniesthatitis.Itisthusmoreplausible tothink
that Oscar changes his true self, which included
gayness, at the end of these 10 years, rather than
holding that gayness was never part of Oscar’si d e n t i t y .
For the purpose of this paper, we can distinguish two
different senses of the phrase “being true to oneself”:1 )
accurately presenting key features of your narrative
identity to others rather than pretending to be different
fromwhoyoureallyare;and2)refusingtochangesome
of those features in circumstances where it might be
tempting to do so. If Oscar tries to deceive the people
around him about his sexual preferences, he will fail to
be true to himself in the first sense. By undergoing
treatment, he fails to be true to himself in the second
sense—though we might debate whether or not his
doing so is of normative significance. Failing to be true
to oneself in this second sense need not be wrong, even
prima facie; it is not the same as being inauthentic.
Finally, it follows from what I have said that the traits
and dispositions that will count as part of someone’s true
self are actual, and not merely possible ones. A person’s
true self is not the same as her ideal self. For instance,
suppose that after having manifested an irascible
disposition for years, I finally succeed, by working
hard on myself, in learning to manage my anger and
developing a more equanimous frame of mind. It then
seems more plausible to say that I have changed some
aspect of my true self for the better, rather than saying
6 These dispositions need not necessarily be robust, cross-
situational ones. We should take into account the recent
challenge to the idea of robust character traits based on findings
from social psychology: see e.g. Doris [9] and Harman [18].
7 The list just given seems at least relevant to Western culture. I
am willing to concede that exactly which traits are to count as
central might to some extent be culturally dependent: different
cultures might have different views on this issue, making
different traits decisive in shaping their members’ lives. This
point is raised by Rorty and Wong [30], and I largely agree with
the detailed account of identity that they offer.
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(equanimous)trueself,andhavebecomemoreauthentic.
Of course, the fact that I regard equanimity as an ideal to
be striven for might make a significant difference to the
shape my life takes, in which case it will meet my
condition for being a part of my true self. But even then,
it is my commitment to becoming more equanimous that
will count as part of my identity, not the actual trait of
equanimity itself, as long as I have not fully succeeded
in acquiring it.
Having outlined the three categories of views on
authenticity that will guide my discussion of the




New technologies that allow us to intervene on our
memory in various ways are increasingly being devel-
oped. Following Matthew Liao and Anders Sandberg
[20], we can distinguish two forms of memory modifi-
cation: memory enhancement, and memory editing.
Memory Enhancement
Enhancements, as I understand them, are interven-
tions that make a person’s life go better in one
particular respect. Cognitive enhancement, for in-
stance, makes the life of the person who uses it go
better in at least one respect, namely, insofar as her
cognitive capacities are rendered more effective than
they would otherwise be. That doesn’t mean, however,
thatsomethingwhichisproperlycalledanenhancement
must necessarily make the enhanced person’s life better
overall, i.e. when all relevant considerations have been
taken into account. Solomon’s self-esteem problems,
induced by his enhanced memory, might for instance
damage his career and general well-being to the point
that his life would be made overall worse than before.
In the literature on the topic, one often finds the
further assumption that for something to qualify as
an enhancement, it has to improve upon normal
functioning; otherwise it is a case of treatment, not
enhancement. I personally find it simpler to just
speak of enhancements whenever we are dealing
with an intervention that makes someone’s life go
better in some respect, but one might want to
remember that some enhancements in my sense will
fall on the “treatment” side of the dichotomy, will
others will fall on the side of “enhancement” in the
strict sense.
Memory enhancement is not a new phenomenon:
the use of mnemonic devices—such as the so-called
method of loci—dates back at least to classical
antiquity (see e.g. Yates [37] ) .H o w e v e r ,i no u r
pharmacological age, a variety of memory enhancer
drugs have been developed. Some such drugs appear
to enhance long-term memory, others, short-term
memory. A small study thus suggested that airline
pilots using the Alzheimer’s drug Aricept (donepezil)
showed an improvement in short-term memory [15];
Modafinil has also been shown to enhance working
memory in healthy test subjects [1, p. 317]. Another
study found that histone deacetylase inhibitors, used
in clinical trials to treat cancer, could boost long-term
memory [36]. Finally, there is evidence that the
salience of an emotionally loaded memory can be
enhanced [20, pp.87–8]. In the future we might see
the appearance of more spectacular forms of memory
enhancement technologies such as implantable brain
chips, which might improve either short-term or long-
term memory capacity [23].
Memory Editing
By memory editing, I shall understand all methods of
modifying memory in a desirable way that do not involve
enhancing it—at least not directly. I do not deny that there
might be cases where memory editing would result in
memory enhancement: for instance, erasing an obsessive
memory from someone’s mind might improve hergeneral
well-being and thereby the effectiveness of her cognitive
functioning, including her memory capacity. But even in
such cases memory editing can still be distinguished from
memory enhancement, which it causes.
One form of memory editing consists in reducing the
vividness of a memory. This aim can be achieved by
using so-called “beta-blocker” drugs. For instance,
taking the beta-blocker propranolol shortly after a
traumatic event has been shown to reduce the intensity
of the memory and the risk of post-traumatic stress
disorder ([20], p.88; see also [35], p.224). It is even
possible to induce false memories in someone, a
process made easier by the fact that our memories are
already to a large extent reconstructions rather than
faithful copies of past experiences ([20], p.88; see also
240 A. ErlerLoftus [22]). Recent research also suggests that it
might soon become possible to selectively erase
undesired memories from our minds [17].
Let us now consider whether or not these technol-
ogies raise significant concerns about authenticity, by
analyzing my four memory modification scenarios
from the perspective of the three accounts of
authenticity distinguished above.
MMTs and Authenticity
Authenticity and Memory Enhancement
Introduction
Memory enhancement seems to have many benefits to
offer. This is because, in many cases at least, it is
preferabletobeabletorecallthethingswewanttorecall
than to be unable to do so. Scholarship, philosophical
reflection, and decision-making in a range of different
fields fundamentally depend on that very ability. True,
the example of Solomon shows that memory enhancers
could have undesirable side effects that would notably
pose a problem of inauthenticity. All three accounts of
authenticity presented above imply that Solomon’sl i f e
becomes inauthentic in one respect once he starts using
memory enhancers, though the reasons they provide for
such a verdict will not be exactly the same. On the
Frankfurtian and existentialist accounts, the problem is
that Solomon does not endorse his resulting feelings of
low self-worth (feelings that are clearly of significance
forhislifeafterwards).TheaccountthatIhavedefended
willyieldasomewhatdifferentjustificationforspeaking
of an inauthentic life: the memory enhancers used by
Solomon prevent him from remaining true to himself
when doing so would have been valuable. To flesh this
out, I need to introduce the idea of reasons to feel and
react, an idea that will also prove crucial for my
discussion of memory editing and authenticity.
Reasons to Feel and React
Many of our emotions and states of mind, but also
many of the attitudes we take towards others and
ourselves, such as self-esteem, seem to admit of
reasons. These reasons make the relevant emotions
and attitudes, and the actions they elicit, appropriate
or inappropriate, reasonable or unreasonable. Philos-
ophers have thus variously spoken of “appropriate
emotions” (see e.g. Mulligan [25], though the idea
goes back at least to Aristotle); “fitting attitudes” (e.g.
Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen [28]); or of
reasons to feel and to act (e.g. Skorupski [33],
pp.26ff). Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson have
pointed out a complication regarding the idea of
appropriate emotions [4]: namely, a certain emotion
might sometimes be appropriate, or fitting, in circum-
stances C, even though what we have most reason to
feel, all things considered, in such circumstances, is
not that emotion but a different one. For instance, it
might be imprudent to feel amusement at a joke one
has just recollected, because, say, one can expect this
to lead to an uncontrollable bout of laughter; and
laughter would be perceived as offensive in the
circumstances—say, at a funeral. The joke in question
might nevertheless be genuinely amusing, yet all
things considered, one has most reason not to feel
amused by it. This issue will need to be taken into
account when we discuss the cases of Carl and Liz.
Some of our reasons to feel and react are moral ones.
If someone you loved has just died, this gives you a
reason to feel grief and to respond to this situation by
mourning. If a friend has betrayed you, you have a
reason to feel resentful. Others are non-moral, such as
the reason to laugh at a joke that is funny. A borderline
case is self-esteem. Following Rebecca Roache, we can
concisely define self-esteem as a global estimation of
one’s own worth (Roache [29], p.74). There seem to be
reasons for self-esteem, and these are provided by the
qualities and achievements of the agent that actually
justify her in feeling proud about them, independently
of what she herself thinks. A young person might for
instance have great athletic abilities, and these would
give her a reason to have quite a high self-esteem. Yet
this reason might still be causally ineffective if for
instance her parents had impressed upon her the idea
that athletic achievements are despicable.
I would also like to suggest that we should make
room for a degree of pluralism about the type of
responses to life events that are to count as
reasonable. True, in some cases, only one particular
way of responding to the relevant situation might be
reasonable: in the case of losing a loved one, for
example, grief seems to be the only reasonable
response. However, consider again the case of
Elizabeth. I am tempted to say that both Liz’s
initial resentful feelings and unwillingness to
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reasonable responses in their respective situations.
Liz reacts the way most of us, I presume, would
r e a c ti ns u c hc i r c u m s t a n c es, and her reaction is a
perfectly reasonable one: her classmates caused her
much gratuitous suffering but none of them appear
in the least sorry for what they did. Sonya’s
response is a much less common one. Being
naturally more thick-skinned than Liz, the mistreat-
ment she experienced did not affect her as deeply,
and as a consequence she hardly feels any resent-
ment at all towards the girls in her class. What they
did was no big deal, she thinks; people change with
time, and we should thus move on and not dwell on
the past. Calling Sonya’s response unreasonable
would seem unfair: surely it is permissible for her
to show such magnanimity, and some would even
argue that she deserves to be praised as a saintly
person. However, I would resist the claim that
Sonya’s affective response to victimization is
objectively preferable to that of Liz, and that
unconditionally forgiving such wrongs must be
superior, from a moral perspective, to withholding
forgiveness. One could for instance retort, plausibly
enough, that Liz’s greater sensitivity to the wrongs
she has experienced has given her a keener sense of
justice and made her a more self-respecting person
than Sonya.
I shall therefore assume that Liz and Sonya’s
emotional responses to their past experiences are both
equally reasonable. As long as we do not take these
responses into account, the belief that those who bullied
them are worth forgiving unconditionally, and the belief
that they are not, will also count as equally reasonable,
and so will the decisions to unconditionally forgive, and
not to do so. However, I want to add that Liz and
Sonya’s respective emotional responses in turn make
different courses of action prima facie appropriate for
each of them: the appropriate thing to do for Liz is to
withhold forgiveness in the absence of an apology,
whereas for Sonya it is to unconditionally forgive her
bullies, at least prima facie. This still leaves open the
question of what they have most reason to do, all
things considered. I will return to Liz’s case later on.
Memory Enhancement and Authenticity, Continued
To come back now to Solomon: I would say that he
ends up living a life that is to some extent inauthentic
insofar as by enhancing his memory, he (unwittingly)
interferes with one key aspect of his identity. Namely,
he causes his level of self-esteem to undergo a sharp
drop, whereas (by hypothesis) Solomon would not be
feeling this way about himself had he not taken the
memory enhancers. And this is a bad thing insofar as,
I am assuming, Solomon has no reason to have low
self-esteem—it is not the case that having started to
enhance his memory, he performs a series of vile
actions that would warrant a very negative re-
evaluation of his own worth as an individual. This
explanation is different from the one given by the
Frankfurtian and existentialist accounts, but I think
these explanations are compatible and that they
complement each other well.
Yet at the normative level, all that Solomon’sc a s e
really implies is that we should preferably choose, or
develop, memory enhancers that do not have such side
effects. And even in cases where memory enhancement
made one’s life inauthentic in some respect, this
consideration might still be outweighed by the benefits
derived: suppose that Solomon were able to give
preciousevidenceataninternational criminaltrial about
thethingshehadwitnessedinacountryravagedbycivil
war, evidence he could not have given had he not
enhanced his memory. A few self-esteem problems that
could be dealt with through counseling or self-help might
beanacceptableprice topayforsuchabenefit.Also,even
when memory enhancement brought to mind seriously
disruptive memories, it might still be possible—in the
future at least—to remedy this problem by combining the
enhancement with selective memory editing. Because of
this, I am not persuaded that the risk of disruptive
memories, and the associated risk of inauthenticity,
is a serious problem for memory enhancement
technologies.
Some authors have argued that self-deception, which
sometimes depends on having inaccurate memories, is
actually a quasi-universal practice without which many
people would find it impossible to feel good about
themselves (see e.g. Nyberg [26], pp.86ff). This surely
deserves to be taken into consideration, yet not
everyone appears unable to take an honest look at
themselves and their past. And even if those able to do
so happen to be a minority, they at least could still
benefit from memory enhancement. Other people
might perhaps increase their ability to confront reality
by working with a therapist before undergoing long-
term memory enhancement. And those who could not
242 A. Erlermanage to do so might still want to use memory
enhancement on a short-term basis—though they might
also, for prudential reasons, prefer to stay away from its
radical forms.
Memory enhancement technologies do not necessar-
ily threaten our authenticity. Given their various
potential benefits, we have strong reasons to want to
use them provided that they are reasonably safe: e.g.
they could promote self-cultivation, or moral improve-
ment, given that a better memory would likely mean a
more accurate picture of ourselves and of others, and a
greaterabilitytolearnfromourpastmistakes.Thatisnot
to say that current memory enhancers do not have their
limitationsanddrawbacks(forevidenceofsuchpossible
drawbacks, see e.g. De Jongh et al. [5], pp.769–71). Yet
since such drawbacks, are only a contingent fact about
memory enhancers, I will not deal with them any
further here. Indeed, I wish to focus on the ethical
implications of the safest and most attractive MMTs we
can hope to have available in the future.
8
Authenticity and Memory Editing
Concerns About Identity
The issue of authenticity mostly arises in relation to
memory editing.
9 It is in this context that the President’s
Council on Bioethics raises it, with the Lady Macbeth
case, as well as in other passages like the following:
By “rewriting” memories pharmacologically we
might succeed in easing real suffering at the risk
of falsifying our perception of the world and
undermining our true identity [35, p.227].
A difficulty with such passages, as DeGrazia [7,
p.232] has pointed out, is that they do not make it clear
which sense of identity, numerical or narrative, is being
used. If the former, the claim that Lady Macbeth would
no longer be the same person once she had made
herself forget her role in the murder of Duncan
becomes implausible: surely she would not thereby
cease to exist and be replaced by a distinct individual.
We don’t usually suppose that we cease to exist after
we have forgotten some particular fact, no matter how
important. Let us then assume that it is in fact narrative
identity that the authors have in mind in the passages
quoted before. The argument would then be that by
erasing her memory of the murder, Lady Macbeth
would re-shape her narrative identity, and this would be
wrong because inauthentic. Yet it is unclear that even a
fundamental change in a person’s narrative identity
constitutes a problem in itself. Clearly, changing
oneself, even radically, isn’t intrinsically wrong. On
the contrary, it can sometimes be virtuous, as in the
case of an individual steeped in moral corruption who
manages to significantly reform himself.
Truthfulness
The last passage quoted above suggests a more
plausible objection. Perhaps what is wrong with
people like Carl or the amnesiac Lady Macbeth is
that they change themselves in a way that distorts
their perception of the world and prevents them from
“living truthfully” [35, p.233]; this is what makes
them inauthentic. Such a line of argument will be
welcomed by existentialists. DeGrazia, for instance,
would concur that these two agents act inauthenti-
cally, as their self-creation projects involve deceiving
themselves. Erasing her memory of the crime leads
Lady Macbeth to falsely believe that she has had no
part in the murder of Duncan. Similarly, Carl ends up
falsely believing that hasn’t committed any crimes,
and also—say—that he had a childhood without
problems.
10 The existentialist explanation is persua-
sive in these two cases.
8 De Jongh et al. [5], as well as Glannon [16], pp.48–49, also
suggest that undesirable effects on cognition might unavoidably
accompany a superior memory, rather than simply being tied to
currently available enhancers. Yet the existence of people like
Mozart, or Sukarno, Indonesia’s first president, suggests that it
is possible to have exceptional powers of memory without
having to suffer serious drawbacks because of it. There might
be a degree beyond which the costs of memory enhancement
become too high, but it would still seem to leave room for quite
a large amount of enhancement, including via pharmacological
means.
9 Which also raises a number of other ethical issues, such as the
risk that important information might get erased from people’s
minds (e.g. preventing witnesses from giving accurate testimo-
ny about some traumatic event in a trial). I will not, however,
consider those other issues here.
10 Of course, memory erasure raises a technical issue: it seems
difficult to ensure that one will not, sooner or later, be exposed
to the information that one has made oneself forget. But let us
assume for the sake of argument that Lady Macbeth and Carl
go on living their lives in environments where they are
sheltered from such exposure.
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account can justify describing these two agents as
making inauthentic choices (and living inauthentic lives
afterwards), as long as we assume that they wholeheart-
edly endorse their desire to deceive themselves for their
own good. I don’t want to claim that the Frankfurtian
account is just plain mistaken here. It does seem
plausible to say that the choices made by Carl and Lady
Macbeth are indeed authentic in one sense—namely,
these choices are truly their own: they haven’tb e e n
pressured or manipulated into making them, and are not
in two minds about them. As Erik Parens has suggested
[27], authenticity is a notion with a plurality of
legitimate understandings. What I do want to claim is
that the Frankfurtian account does not tell us the whole
truth about the matter. There is an important sense in
which the choices made by these agents, and their lives
afterwards, are indeed inauthentic. To capture this, we
need to appeal to the existentialist account.
Nevertheless, the demands of authenticity need not
always override any competing considerations. E.g. if
his traumatic memories of abuse were causing him a
lot of suffering that neither psychotherapy nor
propranolol could be expected to sufficiently allevi-
ate, erasing the memories might be morally permis-
sible for Carl. More generally, it might be appropriate
to use memory editing to relieve unnecessary suffer-
ing, even if this led some people to live less truthfully
than before. In such cases, the fitting emotions and
what the agents have most reason to feel would come
apart. In the case of Lady Macbeth, however, we
might say that her painful feelings of guilt do not
exempt her from the duty to live truthfully. She is no
innocent victim, and her guilt feelings are a fitting
response to the crime she has helped commit. The
only ethically acceptable way out of her suffering
would be for her to repent, and maybe turn herself in
and face the punishment that would follow. As for
Carl, he at least has a reason (if not a duty, depending
on how exactly we construe his case) not to erase the
memories of his past crimes. There is something
seriously disturbing about a murderer who lives his
life believing that he has never done much harm to
anyone. Also, it is plausible to think that Carl owes it
to his victim to remember that he has shot him dead.
Now what about the carefree Lady Macbeth, who
doesn’t removethememoryof her crimebut merelyblunts
its emotional impact with the help of propranolol? It is less
clear that the existentialist account can justify describing
her choice, and her life afterwards, as inauthentic. (The
Frankfurtian account will clearly not support that verdict,
for the same reasons given before.) Suppose her choice
met DeGrazia’s conditions for autonomy. Would it still be
somehow dishonest? There is no reason to think that it
must involve deceiving either herself or others about some
non-moral fact.
11 This suggests that for DeGrazia, there
are no grounds for thinking that the carefree Lady
Macbeth made an inauthentic choice, and that this choice
leads her to live an inauthentic life, if her choice to use
propranolol meets the honesty and autonomy conditions.
I believe this is mistaken. Once again, I agree that she
makes a decision that is authentic in one sense (insofar as
it meets the Frankfurtian criterion for authenticity), but I
would maintain that there is another, important sense in
which her decision is inauthentic, and that this deserves
an explanation.
Maybe, however, existentialists could still retain the
verdict of inauthenticity by arguing that the carefree
Lady Macbeth is guilty of self-deception of a specifi-
cally moral kind. I am not aware that any author has
presented such an argument, and it would not be
available to Sartreans, given that it seems to involve a
commitment to the existence of objective moral truths.
But we can see how the argument might go. The
traditional philosophical understanding of self-
deception implies that the self-deceiver starts with the
true belief that ~p, and then intentionally gets himself
to believe that p; or the other way round (see e.g.
Deweese-Boyd [8] and Mele [24], p.92). In the case of
the carefree Lady Macbeth, the existentialist would
have to assume that things work as follows: first, Lady
Macbeth truly believes that she has done something
terribly wrong, as evidenced by her feelings of guilt.
Secondly, by editing her memory, she brings herself to
falsely believe that what she did was not so terribly
wrong, as evidenced by her newfound peace of mind.
From then on, her life is inauthentic as it relies on self-
deception about a significant moral fact.
A Problem for Rival Accounts: Elisabeth’s Case
Such a move would have the disadvantage of relying
on controversial metaethical assumptions that the
11 Of course, Lady Macbeth might lie to other people about her
involvement in the murder of Duncan, but the question here is
whether the act itself of blunting the vividness of her memory
would involve deceiving herself or others.
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however, that it could successfully explain why the
carefree Lady Macbeth’s life is inauthentic. It would
nevertheless not work in the case of Elisabeth. Indeed,
there is no plausible sense in which Liz is deceiving
herself. Following the same line as before, one could argue
that Liz starts with the true belief that those who victimized
her do not deserve to be forgiven unconditionally, and that
by editing her memory, she deliberately leads herself to
acquire the false belief that they deserve to be, making this
another case of moral self-deception. But this would
contradict my assumption that there is a plurality of
reasonable responses in such a case, and that both of these
beliefs about the appropriateness of unconditionally
forgiving are equally reasonable. If my assumption is
correct, this appeal to moral self-deception cannot explain
Liz’sc a s e .
It thus seems that the existentialist and Frankfurtian
accountsmustdenythatLiz’s choice and the life it leads
to are inauthentic in any way. Indeed we are assuming
thatLiz’sdecisiontoedithermemoryisbothhonestand
autonomous, and that she wholeheartedly endorses her
desire to increase her general level of well-being. By
contrast, I believe there is an important sense in which
her choice is inauthentic. I will now try to explain why.
A Solution
I submit that by editing her memory, Liz fails to remain
true to herself in circumstances when doing so would
havebeenpraiseworthy:sheabandonsanimportantpart
of her narrative identity, namely her natural disposition
to withhold forgiveness of mistreatments that she had
experienced as very serious. Her decision isinauthentic,
not because it leads to an inappropriate response to
mistreatmentsofthatsort(weareassumingthatSonya’s
response is not inappropriate), but because she thereby
makes herself react differently from the way she would
otherwise react, and which we are assuming would
also be reasonable.
Some clarifications are needed here. First, the relevant
counterfactual in this case is not e.g. how Liz would react
if she fitted her model of the ideal human being, for the
reasons given before: it is Liz’s actual traits and
dispositions that define her true self before she edits
her memory, not those she wishes she had. Secondly,
even though we cannot say that it is inappropriate to
unconditionally forgive people who have mistreated you
in this manner, it is correct to say that unconditional
forgiveness is not what Liz’s individual nature or
subjectivity makes it appropriate for her to do. I want
to say that her natural affective response gives her a
reason to withhold forgiveness, and also, given the
value of authenticity, a related reason not to edit her
memory. I don’t necessarily wish to claim that this is
also what Liz has most reason to do. Given that a
possible gain in well-being is at stake for her, we may
debate whether the demands of authenticity are
decisive in her case, or whether they are outweighed
by reasons of self-interest.
I would suggest, however, that we ought to seriously
consider the former possibility. Indeed, I am not fully
convinced that considerations of well-being will neces-
sarily tip the balance of reasons in favour of memory
editing. No one else need be harmed if Liz chooses to
remain true to herself and, as a result, does not forgive
her offenders. Let us assume that whether or not Liz has
forgiven them is no concern of theirs, and that Liz has
no interest in retaliation. We should also note that there
seem to be ways for her to promote her well-being
without interfering with her memories. For instance,
rather than wishing she didn’th a v es u c hu n p l e a s a n t
memories, she could try and give them a new, more
positive meaning, seeing herself as a “survivor” who
managed to overcome great hardships, and enjoying the
contrast between her happy present situation and her
good future prospects on the one hand, and the painful
times of her teenage years on the other. It is thus not
clear that memory editing must make a significant
differencewhenitcomestopromotingLiz’swe ll -b ei ng .
Liz’s case points to a broader concern about
technologies like MMTs: the concern that they might
be used by people to change the reasonable affective
responsestheyhavetocertainevents,toreplacethemby
other responses, for reasons that are less than compel-
ling. For instance, the latter responses—even though
theymightbereasonableaswell—mightsimplyhappen
to be more in keeping with the social ethos,o rt h e y
might unjustifiably be presented as the only ones
compatible with a happy life. By editing their memory,
highly sensitive people like Liz might bring themselves
to respond to life’s events as if they were thick-skinned
and easy-going. This can be presented as a worry
about reducing human diversity, but it can also be
understood as a threat to our authenticity. Using MMTs
in such ways would prevent people from remaining
true to themselves when doing so would be valuable.
We might want to say to Liz: you are fully entitled to
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you, and your particular sensitivity is valuable and
worthy of respect. And even though Sonya’s sensitivity
might also be valuable in a different way, there is no
good reason for you to want to be like her.
Let me make it clear that the concern I have put
forward is not one about “artificial” vs. “natural”
means of enhancing well-being, even though the
debate about authenticity is sometimes framed in
those terms. My remarks can equally be applied to
ways of changing our emotional responses that do not
involve the use of technology or pharmacology.
Suppose for instance that Liz could blunt the
vividness of her memories in exactly the same way
by repeating positive mantras every day. If we assume
that this method worked by directly (though gradual-
ly) blunting the emotional impact of her memories,
without first appealing to her rational capacities and
changing some of her beliefs, then all of my remarks
about memory editing would still hold.
I would explain the inauthenticity of the carefree
Lady Macbeth along the same lines as Liz’s. By
blunting the vividness of her painful memory, Lady
Macbeth deliberately interferes with her disposition to
respond to the reason she has to feel guilty, a
disposition that is an important part of her identity
and that she should exercise. Had she declined to edit
her memory for the right reasons (e.g. because she
didn’t want to escape from what she recognized as
justified feelings of guilt), she would have deserved
some measure of praise. Her choice to use propran-
olol is therefore an inauthentic one on my account.
And if we assume that its effects last for a sufficiently
long period of time, her life as a whole will count as
inauthentic, as she will then remain disconnected
from the reasons she has to feel guilty, reasons to
which she would have responded had she not blunted
the emotional impact of her memories of the deed.
This might well be what the authors of Beyond
Therapy were getting at in their worries about “under-
mining our true identity”, but if so their phrasing is
much too vague. They also write that “[a]ltering the
formation of emotionally powerful memories risks...
falsifying our perception and understanding of the
world. It risks making shameful acts seem less
shameful, or terrible acts less terrible, than they really
are” [35, p.228]. And indeed, part of what is wrong
with the carefree Lady Macbeth is that she is unable to
see her past crime in all its badness, and to respond by
feeling guilt. The inauthenticity issue, however, is a
slightly different one. Suppose Lady Macbeth was just a
cold-bloodedassassin,whofeltnoguiltwhatsoeverabout
the murder of Duncan. Clearly her perception of her own
deed would be inappropriate and blameworthy, but I
assume we wouldn’t call her inauthentic—we would just
describe her as callous. What makes the epithet “inau-
thentic” applicable to the memory-editing Lady Macbeth
is our assumption that she would have experienced guilt
had she not chosen to edit her memory, together with
our belief that it is blameworthy to prevent yourself
from experiencing guilt in such circumstances.
Implications of the Different Accounts for Scenarios
1–4: A Comparison
Let us assume that with the exception of Solomon, all
agents in scenarios 1 to 4 meet DeGrazia’sc o n d i t i o n s
for autonomy (see “Three Different Accounts”), and
that they wholeheartedly endorse their choices and the
preferences that guided them. Now let us ask: do the
agents in these four scenarios end up living inauthentic
lives as a consequence of modifying their memory? In a
schematic form, here is a recapitulation of the answers
provided to the question by, respectively, the account of
authenticity as wholeheartedness, the existentialist
account, and my own “true self” account (the four













Elisabeth No No Yes
Carl No Yes Yes
Solomon Yes Yes Yes
The very same answers will apply to the question
whether the agents make an inauthentic choice when
deciding to manipulate their memory—except in the
case of Solomon, whose choice will presumably
qualify as authentic on all three accounts. By
hypothesis, he wholeheartedly identifies with the
first-order preferences that guide it, such as his desire
to become more effective at doing his job. His choice
is both honest and autonomous—even though he
lacks relevant information about the effects of the
enhancers when he starts taking them, he keeps using
246 A. Erlerthem even after he has learned about those effects.
Finally, by choosing to enhance his memory, he is
being true to his commitment to self-improvement,
which is worthy of praise. The subsequent inauthen-
ticity of Solomon’s life is not a matter of his having
made an inauthentic choice, but it solely results from
the unexpected side effects of the memory enhancers.
Regarding the memory editing scenarios, my own
account is the only one that can uphold the charge of
inauthenticity in all four cases. Since I find quite
plausible the intuition that these agents are in an
important sense making inauthentic choices and living
inauthentic lives, I think this shows that my account has
a useful role to play in assessing those cases. Again, I
see it as a complement rather than a substitute to rival
accounts. The verdictsyielded by these accountsare not
incorrect,asthey docapture other, legitimateusesofthe
notion of authenticity than my account does. What is
incorrect, however, is to claim that these rival accounts
tell us everything that needs to be said about the
authenticity of the agents in my examples.
Intrinsic vs. Instrumental Value of Authenticity
Finally, let me point out that my criticism of such
possible uses of memory editing isn’t utilitarian in
nature, even though it is important to note the benefits
that authenticity can bring with regard to human well-
being. Unconditionally forgiving her former tormen-
tors after she has edited her memory might for
instance extinguish the motivation Liz would other-
wise have had to join a campaign against bullying or
against other forms of victimization, to which she
could have made a significant contribution. Also, if
more victims of such acts were willing to uncondi-
tionally forgive their tormentors, one possible deter-
rent might be lost. This shows that authentic decisions
can sometimes be of instrumental value, yet I don’t
think we need to make such assumptions about the
consequences of Elisabeth’sd e c i s i o ni no r d e rt o
criticize it as inauthentic. Also, in Carl’s case,
utilitarians should presumably embrace memory edit-
ing without any hesitation, since for them memory is
only valuable instrumentally. By contrast, I would
argue that there is something intrinsically valuable
about remembering at least roughly correctly such
important past experiences, and living one’s life in
accordance with the knowledge provided by such
memories. True, this value will have to be weighed
against the possible negative value of the foreseeable
consequences of such a state, and the latter might
sometimes outweigh the former. As I have said, it
might be permissible for Carl to erase his traumatic
memories of abuse if this were his only means of
escaping a significant amount of unnecessary suffer-
ing. Nevertheless, the value of accurate memories and
of a life based on them should be acknowledged, even
if it isn’t always decisive. It would also justify setting
an order of priority among the possible ways of
dealing with problems such as Carl’s experience of
childhood abuse. Carl would have a reason to try and
do so via therapy and counseling, even if it proved
more arduous, than via memory editing. Were he to
act on that reason, he would deserve some degree of
praise for his authentic choice. And his doctors should
encourage him to do so, though in the end the choice
should probably be left up to him.
Conclusion
MMTs can pose a threat to authenticity. Both memory
enhancement and memory editing can be used in ways
that lead to a life which is in an important sense
inauthentic, as in cases 1–4. Memory enhancement,
however, does not seem by its very nature to raise
problems about authenticity. Such problems would
rather be linked to its possible side effects. Given that
these side effects are merely contingent ones, and that
memoryenhancersholdmuchpromisewhenitcomesto
promoting our well-being or pursuing other goods such
as knowledge or practical wisdom, we have strong
reasons to develop, and use, enhancers that would not
have such side effects (or not too serious ones).
Memory editing, on the other hand, poses a threat
to authenticity that is not merely related to unintended
side effects. First, as existentialists would claim, it is
inauthentic to edit our memories when doing so
involves deceiving ourselves, the way Carl and the
amnesiac Lady Macbeth do. Secondly, memory
editing could be used by some people to inauthenti-
cally induce in themselves certain emotions, states of
mind (such as well-being) and attitudes (such as self-
esteem), by tinkering with their disposition to respond
in certain ways to certain life events, when they do
have reasons to respond in such ways.
It doesn’t follow that we have a moral duty to
forfeit memory editing every time this would be the
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traumatic events have such a duty would seem
excessively harsh. But it remains that in every such
case we will still have a moral reason, grounded in
the value of authenticity, not to edit our memory.
Whether acting on that reason is obligatory or not will
depend on the strength of the competing reasons,
grounded for instance in the agent’s self-interest,
speaking against the authentic course of action.
Finally, considerations of authenticity clearly do not
justify a ban on memory editing procedures (and even
less so on memory enhancers). They do, however,
suggest the inadequacy of a completely liberal policy
endorsing the use of such procedures for any purpose
except when they can be expected to cause positive
harm to someone. The considerations I have adduced
might provide grounds for doctors to refuse to meet,
or at least try to discourage requests for memory
editing for “cosmetic” purposes, such as Liz’s.
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